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Abstract
Background: Efficient A(H5N1) control is unlikely to be based on epidemiological data alone. Such control depends
on a thorough understanding and appreciation of the interconnectedness of epidemiological, social, and economic
factors that contribute to A(H5N1) vulnerability. To date, the control of A(H5N1) in Egypt has been challenging. The
disease has been endemic for more than 10 years with a dramatic increase in human cases between December 2014
and March 2015. Part of the problem has been a lack of understanding of the inter-play of drivers, conditions and
motives that influence preventive behaviours at the household level.
Methods: To address this issue, the authors developed a Composite Risk Index (CRI) to inform decision-makers of
critical epidemiological, livelihood, food security and risk perception factors that were found to contribute to A(H5N1)
vulnerability at the community level. The CRI consists of seven constructs that were individually scored for each
community. The seven constructs included poultry sales, previous flock exposure to A(H5N1), human risk probability,
sense of control over the disease, preventative actions taken, level of household food insecurity and community norms
toward certain handling and disposal practices. One hundred forty female poultry keepers across four governorates
were interviewed in 2010 using a mix of random and purposive sampling techniques. A mixed method approach
underpinned the analysis. The study used wealth ranking in order to help decision-makers in understanding the
specific constraints of different wealth groups and aid better targeting of A(H5N1) control and prevention strategies.
Results: Poverty, widowhood and lack of education were among the factors associated with high risk scores. CRI
scores in those villages where awareness raising had taken place were not significantly different compared to those
villages where awareness raising had not taken place.
Conclusions: The aim of the tool is to enable targeting those communities that are likely to be highly vulnerable to
A(H5N1) outbreaks and where control and awareness-raising efforts are expected to be most effective. In this manner,
policy makers and practitioners will be able to better allocate limited resources to those communities most vulnerable
to the negative impact of A(H5N1).
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Background
Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) subtype
H5N1, hereafter referred to as A(H5N1), has been en-
demic in Egypt for almost a decade. Up to 8 January
2018, 860 human cases have been reported worldwide,
42% of these cases have been reported in Egypt [1]. Over
90% of human infections are due to close contact with
backyard poultry [2]. The majority of clinical cases have
been women and children, who are the main caretakers
of household flocks in rural areas [2–5].
It is estimated that five to seven million Egyptian rural
households are involved in household poultry produc-
tion [6]. Poultry meat is the most consumed animal pro-
tein source, it supplies roughly 53% of daily protein
intake compared to bovine, mutton and goat meat [5, 7].
This share is likely higher among the poor as poultry
meat is relatively cheap compared to other meats. Fur-
thermore, poultry provide a relatively large share of total
household income particularly among the poor and
widowed [8, 9]. A flock of 73 birds (mixed species) pro-
vides an average annual net income of approximately US
$397 [6]. This is significantly more than a government
widower’s pension of approximately US $140 annually.
Historically, the government of Egypt has adopted a
number of mechanisms aimed at limiting the spread of
A(H5N1) and lowering the risk of human infection, with
varying degrees of success. Traditional stamping out
mechanisms such as widespread culling of flocks and
mass vaccination have been heavily relied upon to con-
trol the disease [10–13]. Despite such measures, Egypt
has experienced a dramatic increase in human cases dur-
ing the winter of 2014/2015 [3, 12–15]. Nonetheless the
number of human cases is likely underreported [2, 15].
Kayeli et al. [15] conclude from a serologic study that
the true number would probably amount to several hun-
dred thousand human cases.
Control efforts have also included awareness-raising
campaigns at the community level to promote the appli-
cation of basic biosecurity measures [5]. However, few
baseline studies have been conducted, which would have
given insight into risk behaviour of specific target groups
including subsets of household poultry producers [10].
Although these campaigns succeeded in raising aware-
ness, the problem of low uptake of these measures at
the household level remained [5, 10, 16]. This
phenomenon of high A(H5N1) awareness but low
uptake of preventive measures has been reported in
many other contexts [17–19]. Reasons for non-
compliance with preventive measures are manifold.
Mistrust in government practices play an important
role, as well as a lack of information at the commu-
nity level as reported for Egypt [5, 10, 11, 16] but
also in Asia [18, 21, 22]. In Egypt post vaccination
sudden death of poultry, likely caused by incorrect
vaccination or lack of biosecurity practices on the
part of veterinary personnel, caused reluctance to vac-
cinate among poultry owners [11]. In addition the
vaccines used in the field were not efficacious due to
improper antigenic matching between vaccines and
circulating viruses [2, 15, 22].
Equally problematic, in recent years there has been a
decline in public awareness of the risks [5, 10, 12, 14,
22]. Indeed, A(H5N1) outbreaks in poultry in Egypt are
suspected to be heavily underreported [10, 23]. Women,
in particular are often reluctant to report the disease
mainly out of fear of loss of income, loss of poultry meat
and eggs to feed the family and the inability to fulfil cer-
tain socio-cultural roles such as providing guests with
poultry meat and eggs or contributing to particular cul-
tural and religious ceremonies [8, 9]. Similarly, Paul et
al. [20] describe how financial value and prestige com-
bined with cultural value, fear of loss of genetic re-
sources and personal bond of owners with their cocks all
contributed towards reluctance to report outbreaks
among the cockfighting community in Thailand. In
Vietnam reporting was associated by farmers with un-
certain outcomes and transaction costs, in addition to
market disturbance resulting in lower market value of
poultry [21].
Social norms may also prevent poultry keepers from
applying biosecurity measures. In one study in Egypt a
situation was described where participants explained
that they had been mocked within their community for
wearing protective clothes when dealing with poultry
[16]. Social norm also plays an important role in influen-
cing how cock farmers manage A(H5N1) infection risk
among a tight-knight community in Thailand [20].
Therefore, a deeper understanding of the perceptions
of risk, local beliefs and rationales regarding A(H5N1)
and social norm are needed for understanding and facili-
tating changes in biosecurity behaviours [5, 20, 21, 24].
As Fielding et al. ([24]: page 19) clarified:
“simply providing information takes no account of a
population’s causal attributions, perceived risks,
perceptual bias or structural determinants of
behaviour, and is unlikely to result in significant and
sustained change.”
Egyptian government veterinary services are stretched
in terms of human and financial resources [10, 11, 25].
Vaccination alone absorbed more than 80% of the
budget for influenza control [10, 23]. Limited human
resources and low vaccination coverage, coupled with
improper use of vaccines and limited biosecurity precau-
tions practiced by the vaccination squads have been a
major contributory factor for the A(H5N1) endemic [10,
11, 23, 25].
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Since the 2011 political crisis the situation has deterio-
rated. Unemployment remains persistently high, particu-
larly among women [26]. Food prices have risen and
poverty has increased particularly in rural Upper Egypt
where 57% fall below the income poverty line [26]. At
present the incidence of A(H5N1) and A(H9N2) is in-
creasing and co-infection of poultry with these two vi-
ruses may create the potential for reassortment of these
viruses [2, 15]. The present economic crisis is likely to
increase people’s dependency on poultry as a source of
income and a cheap source of animal protein. At the
same time coping strategies aiming at preserving poultry
as a source of income and food may involve risky prac-
tices. Media attention to A(H5N1) has dwindled and has
moved on to more acute issues such as the economic
and political crisis. This has led people to believe
A(H5N1) no longer possess a threat and reduces the felt
need to adhere to biosecurity practices that were already
badly understood and perceived as cumbersome and im-
practical [5, 8, 16].
Much of the literature on A(H5N1) has taken an epi-
demiological approach describing and analysing (the
often lack of ) biosecurity practices of backyard poultry
producers. However, there is an emerging body of litera-
ture describing the social context in which infectious
and zoonotic disease risk is embedded [5, 20, 27–32]. A
holistic approach including cultural, social, economic
and epidemiological aspects must be part of a compre-
hensive risk assessment and control strategy [2, 14, 33].
Such an approach is more relevant now than ever as
Egypt is regarded as a hotspot for the emergence of a
pandemic potential virus while at the same time
A(H5N1) awareness among those most at risk is at a
low.
Given the complex mix of factors contributing to risk
perceptions and behaviours among household poultry
producers, and the limited resources of government vet-
erinary services, there is a need for a more targeted
approach to control and awareness-raising activities at
the community level. To address this need, the authors
created a Composite Risk Index (CRI). The CRI is based
on a range of epidemiological, livelihood, food security
and risk perception factors mentioned in the literature,
which were found to contribute to vulnerability to
A(H5N1) infection. In line with Blaikie et al. [34], vul-
nerability is understood as the potential to suffer harm
or loss, related to the capacity of poultry producers to
anticipate, cope with, and recover from, the impact of an
A(H5N1) outbreak in their household flock. Vulnerabil-
ity, and its opposite resilience, are determined by a mix
of physical, social, economic, cultural, political and
environmental factors [35, 36].
Asset portfolios influence risk attitudes as well as the
means available to manage risk [37]. Earlier work [8, 9]
indicated that the poor have been hardest hit by the im-
pact of A(H5N1) outbreaks and subsequent culling and
control efforts. Other authors have also described how
the poor and uneducated were at higher risk of infection
[18]. Wealthier households (in terms of asset base) are
generally believed to be “more efficient in resource allo-
cation and better situated to handle risk-related losses”
([37]: page 4). Therefore, the CRI distinguishes between
subsets of the poor in order to help decision-makers in
understanding the specific constraints of different wealth




The CRI was underpinned by data from 140 household
interviews and 24 group discussions among female
poultry keepers from lower socio-economic strata resid-
ing across four governorates of Egypt: Fayoum, Assuit,
Menia and Sohag. The governorates were selected based
on their high poverty levels, importance of poultry mea-
sured by the percentage of households keeping poultry
and exposure to A(H5N1) outbreaks in backyard poultry
flocks. The four selected governorates were ranked last
by the Human Development Index at the time of the
study [38]. A WFP/VAM study indicated that the pro-
portion of households keeping poultry was highest in
the governorates of Menia, Assuit, Souhag and Fayoum
(WFP/VAM unit Egypt Country Office, unpublished
data). Official reports indicated that all study districts
and governorates had experienced outbreaks of
A(H5N1) in 2006 and onwards [39].
Pilot testing of the questionnaires took place in August
2010 by the author with the help of a translator. Three
days were spent in the field, testing key informant inter-
views, group discussions and household interviews. The
questionnaires were tested in three different villages in
Fayoum Governorate. Enumerators included two Egyp-
tian female veterinarians with experience of working in
rural areas and one Egyptian male agricultural engineer
experienced in rural development. All enumerators
underwent a three-day training course where a combin-
ation of classroom theory, practical fieldwork and evalu-
ations were used to prepare for the fieldwork. The
training had a particular focus on minimizing bias and
encouraging open and frank discussions with study par-
ticipants. Because of cultural and religious norms, the fe-
male enumerators were responsible for the individual
interviews with female poultry keepers while the male
enumerator would lead the introduction of the research
team to the village head and other village leaders, as well
as conducting the key informant interviews. Individual
interviews took place at a location chosen by the inter-
viewee. In the majority of cases, this would be the home
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or yard of the female poultry keepers and sometimes in
front of their houses or in vegetable stalls or kiosks.
Group interviews were often conducted with one male
and one female enumerator. As the group interviews
took place in public settings with more than one woman,
the presence of a male enumerator was not an issue.
The questionnaires used for this study can be found in
Additional file 1.
Two districts within each of the above-mentioned gov-
ernorates, and three villages in each district were ran-
domly identified for inclusion in the study. All selected
districts (n = 8) had experienced A(H5N1) outbreaks. A
total number of 24 villages were selected. The average
number of persons per village was approximately 13.000
(range: 3.472–29.342); this corresponds with an average
of 2.800 households per village. In each village the team
would first meet with the village mayor (el Omda) or the
head of the village council (Sheikh el Balad) to explain
the aim of our study and to request for facilitation. Dur-
ing this informal meeting an assessment took place
whether or not these individuals would be appropriate
key informants. As the main purpose of the key inform-
ant interview was to inform a wealth ranking exercise
the research team made sure that the selected key in-
formant knew the population of the village. The key in-
formant’s suitability and knowledge were carefully
assessed by means of questions that related to the key
informant’s familiarity with all social and wealth classes
in the village, common indicators of wealth and poverty
and issues affecting socio-economic status and well-
being of community members. All key informants had
public functions such as the village mayor or the head of
the village council but key informants also included the
village religious leader, senior teacher of the village
primary school, director of the community development
association or director of the agricultural cooperative. If
the research team had any doubt about the suitability of
the potential key informant alternative appropriate key
informants would be selected based on referral by the
village mayor.
A total of 24 key informant interviews were done, one
in each study village. The interview took approximately
30 to 45 min on average. The main criteria used by key
informants to differentiate between households were:
ownership of land (and size of land), type of income
source(s) such as seasonal or casual labour vs. fixed
employment, marital status, ownership of large rumi-
nants, education level, and receiving alms (zakat). A de-
tailed list of common indicators was developed for each
wealth group based on the 24 key informant interviews,
see Additional file 2. Indicators mentioned unanimously
by each key informant for a specific wealth group were
identified. In this way, four standardized key character-
istics/assets were identified across all villages; these
included entitlement to alms, ownership of land, univer-
sity education and fixed employment. Categorization by
the key informant was verified for each household. Key
characteristics of the household collected during the
household interview were crosschecked against the list
of common wealth and poverty indicators presented in
Additional file 2, and compared to the categorization of
the key informant. In no case did this yield reason to
change the wealth group allocation of households by the
key informant.
In addition, to establish credibility and reliability of
the wealth indicators, the wealth classes were corrob-
orated with different stakeholders within each village
setting. The most common criteria used by key infor-
mants to establish household’s wealth status have also
been identified in other studies as determinants of
wealth [40, 41]. For example Croppenstedt [40] con-
cluded that the poorest households in Egypt rely on
casual employment and transfers (such as alms and
social welfare pensions), while formal wage employ-
ment is associated with better-off households. He fur-
ther stated that education is the key factor in
determining wage employment and returns and these
returns increase with more education. Household per
capita income is positively correlated with landowner-
ship and landownership was associated with the two
highest income quintiles. Lastly, female-headed house-
holds are particularly disadvantaged and can often be
found among the lowest income quintiles.
The majority of key informants divided the population
of their village into four different wealth categories: very
poor, poor, medium and rich. It was decided to focus on
the three lowest levels, excluding the rich. Key infor-
mants were then asked to identify households of each of
these three different wealth groups. In this manner
wealth ranking was used to stratify the sample at the
household level. These households would then be visited
by the team and asked to participate in an indepth
household interview. Initially 144 households were
approached of which two respondents indicated that
they didn’t want to participate due to time constraints.
Another two participants could not complete the entire
interview and these two were omitted from the sample
frame leaving a total of 140 respondents who completed
the entire interview. These 140 households included
44 very poor households, 48 poor households and 48
medium-wealth households. Key informants also
helped in allocating between five to seven participants
for the group interviews, in which a mix representing
different wealth levels participated. The duration of
the household interviews as well as group discussions
was usually between 60 to 90 min. Data collection
took place during the months of September, October
and November 2010.
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During the analysis process the wealth groups were
further stratified into subsets. Stratification was based
on data collected during the household interview.
Within the very poor, poor and medium wealth
groups, the top level and bottom level of households
were identified, thus creating two subsets within each
wealth group. While the wealth ranking in the field
divided the study group into three broad categories,
the subsequent stratification during the analysis iden-
tified subsets of the very poor, poor and medium
wealth groups based on a combination of specific in-
dicators that were locally recognized as indicators of
poverty or wealth. The initial phase of determining
the subsets within the wealth groups yielded a wide
variety of single and double item subsets. After initial
testing and analysis, it was decided that the two-item
subsets performed best in identifying those house-
holds at the top and bottom level of each wealth
group. As we used two criteria, this meant that sev-
eral households (n = 59) could not be included in the
subsets. The subdivision within the very poor and
poor wealth groups were based on education levels
and marital status while subdivision among the
medium wealth group was based on the size of land
and the education level of the respondent. A total of
81 respondents matched the criteria described above
and as mentioned in in Table 1.
The division into subsets enabled a more intricate un-
derstanding of how marriage and widowhood, education
levels and access to resources influenced a wide range of
issues such as vulnerability to A(H5N1), risk perceptions
and preventive behaviours.
The components of the risk index
Based on the existing literature, the CRI was composed
of the following seven elements: poultry sales, previous
flock exposure, human risk probability, sense of control
over the disease, preventative actions taken, level of
household food insecurity, community norms toward
certain handling and disposal practices. These elements
will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent
sections.
Poultry sales
Live bird markets are well known A(H5N1) risk hotspots
[2, 14, 19, 20, 42, 43]. Therefore, women or their house-
hold members either selling their birds directly at live
bird markets or indirectly to traders have increased risk
of both exposure to and subsequent transmission of
A(H5N1).
Previous exposure to a(H5N1)
Previous outbreaks in household flocks may be indica-
tive of A(H5N1) endemicity and less effective biosecurity
measures being applied by the household. Furthermore
A(H5N1) outbreaks in poultry increase the risk of hu-
man A(H5N1) infection [44]. Outbreaks were identified
where the respondent reported experiencing high mor-
tality rates in her poultry due to A(H5N1) infection dur-
ing the years 2006 to 2010. Information thus depended
on self-reporting and the perceptions of the respondents
and it is acknowledged that this method can be flawed
as respondents could have misinterpreted symptoms of
other diseases (Newcastle disease in particular) as symp-
toms of A(H5N1). However information provided by the
respondents, particularly on the symptoms observed
during perceived outbreaks of A(H5N1), was cross-
checked by the two female enumerators who were both
well-experienced veterinarians.
Low perceived human risk
Risk perception levels were assessed by a three-point
Likert-type scale using the following conditional state-
ment: “Imagine this village is infected with A(H5N1) in
poultry”. Respondents were then asked “How likely
would it be that you or your family members would be
infected with A(H5N1)?” Answer options were given as:
“not likely”, “somewhat likely” and “very likely”. The rat-
ings were used to assess the perceived A(H5N1) risk in
terms of perceived likelihood of human infection (self or
household members). To enhance understanding,
Table 1 Description of subsets
Subset Wealth group Description of subset Number of respondents
1 Very poor Widowed or divorced & no education 13
2 Very poor Married and some education 10
3 Poor Widowed or divorced & no education 14
4 Poor Married and some education 12
5 Medium Up to primary education and≤ 0.21 ha 22
6 Medium Preparatory or higher education and > 0.21 ha 10
Total 81
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questions regarding risk perception were contextualised
as much as possible. For example, a time frame was in-
cluded (i.e. respondents were asked to imagine an infec-
tion in poultry happening now), a setting (in case of an
outbreak in this village) and risk object, i.e. the individ-
ual and her household members as opposed to the gen-
eral population. Clearly respondents who perceived the
likelihood of human infection to be low are likely not to
engage in any self-protective measures thereby putting
these respondents at a higher risk of infection.
Low sense of control over poultry infection
Qualitative content analysis was used to identify under-
lying rationales and beliefs pertaining to specific
A(H5N1) risk levels. First the narrative information col-
lected was categorized into broad themes identified by
examining the transcribed interviews. As such, when re-
spondents were asked to explain their perceived level of
flock infection probability, four broad themes emerged:
a) control practices, b) beliefs, c) exposure and, d) con-
tact levels. Secondly, component topics underlying these
themes were identified. Exposure, for example related to
statements made by the respondents that included ex-
posure or previous experience with A(H5N1) outbreaks.
Topics included: “previous outbreak in own flock” and
“observed outbreak in neighbour flock” The broad cat-
egory of beliefs related to responses that implied certain
beliefs, this included beliefs about the controllability of
the disease, beliefs about susceptibility of poultry birds
or the mode of transmission of the disease but also
about the role of God in determining A(H5N1) infec-
tion. Specific topics identified under this theme were:
“bird flu is airborne” or “bird flu is spread by wild birds”,
“God’s will”, and “bird flu can’t be controlled”.
Any fatalistic notions as well as perceptions that indi-
cated a sense of lack of control were noted. Perceptions
of flock infection that indicated a locus of control out-
side of the respondent such as the particular belief that
flock infection depends on God’s will are detrimental to
A(H5N1) control and need to be targeted.
Lack of precautionary actions
Biosecurity is defined as measures taken to reduce the
risk of introduction and spread of the A(H5N1) virus
[17]. These biosecurity measures are based on the prin-
ciples of bioexclusion and biocontainment [17]. With
this in mind respondents were asked what kind of ac-
tions they had taken to protect themselves and their
household from getting infected and the actions taken to
prevent their flock from getting infected. For each of
these two categories (human preventative behaviour and
poultry preventative behaviour) the number of preventa-
tive actions weres counted. Next, the actions taken by
each household were examined and only those
mentioned in the biosecurity literature as being efficient
were counted.
Those that engaged in two or less effective precaution-
ary actions relevant for preventing poultry and/or hu-
man infection were deemed more vulnerable to
A(H5N1) outbreaks while being more likely to spread
the disease.
Food insecurity
At the household level food insecurity may lead to risky
coping behaviour increasing the risk of A(H5N1) infec-
tion and spread such as consuming dead birds, sale of
sick birds and not reporting sick birds or hiding birds in
the house to avoid culling [8, 45]. A quantitative ap-
proach was used to construct the food insecurity score.
The scale created for this study closely followed that of
Blumberg et al. [46]. However, while Blumberg et al. [46]
only addressed financial access to food, the present food
insecurity component consisted of four elements priori-
tised in the literature: financial access, physical access,
utilisation and socio-cultural dimensions. Responses
were recorded by means of a closed-format binary scale
(yes/no). Each food security component was then scored
with zero or one: zero indicating that no problems and
disruptions had been experienced by the household, and
one indicating problems with the specific component of
food insecurity in the past year. The sum of affirmative
responses comprised a household’s raw score on the
scale. The minimum score for each household would be
zero (i.e. households had not experienced any disrup-
tions across the four food security components in the
past year) and a maximum score of four (indicating that
the household had experienced disruptions across all
four food security components).
The scoring helped to develop a scale from zero to
four in which households on one end of the scale (four)
could be considered more food insecure than those on
the other end of the scale (zero).
Community norms detrimental to a(H5N1) control
Group norm has the power to influence individual
decision-making [20]. Group or community norms re-
garding A(H5N1) prevention and control were assessed
through focus group discussions. In each village one
focus group discussion was held (n = 24). Participants
were asked to rate five statements on a three-point
Likert-type scale according to their notion of the accept-
ability of the action described. The five statements were
as follows:
1. “Is having your poultry scavenge freely in the street:
acceptable, somewhat unacceptable, or
unacceptable?”
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2. “Is throwing dead birds and the remains of
slaughtered birds in the street: acceptable, somewhat
unacceptable, or unacceptable?”
3. “Is burying dead birds: acceptable, somewhat
unacceptable, or unacceptable?”
4. “Is slaughtering sick birds to consume: acceptable,
somewhat unacceptable, or unacceptable?”
5. “Is not reporting your birds infected with A(H5N1) to
the local vet or village leader: acceptable, somewhat
unacceptable, or unacceptable?”
The group members rated the five statements collect-
ively. Usually several group members would respond or
engage in a discussion with their peers after the inter-
viewer had read the question. As the group sizes were
relatively small, the note taker of the group discussion
was able to note the response of each group member in
most cases. The interviewer would then solicit answers
from those group members (if any) who had not spoken.
The collective group rating was either based on consen-
sus of the group or if no consensus was reached through
taking the majority of ratings as the collective group
answer.
Those communities where risky behaviours are gener-
ally accepted are least likely to have a positive effect on
individual behaviours. Thus those communities where
group norms indicated any of the following activities
were acceptable were given a score of 1: scavenging of
poultry in the village, throwing dead birds on the street,
consuming sick birds and not reporting an outbreak or
not burying dead birds.
The composite risk index
The components of the Composite Risk Index are pre-
sented in Table 2.
The maximum score for the CRI was seven for each
respondent. The criteria for the index were as follows:
those households who sold poultry birds received a score
of one as those selling poultry were deemed more likely
to spread the disease. Households having experienced
one or more self-reported outbreaks received a score of
one. Respondents who viewed the human risk probabil-
ity to be low were deemed to be in need of subsequent
awareness raising campaigns as were those respondents
who engaged in only two or less correct preventative ac-
tions relevant for preventing human and/or poultry in-
fection (also accorded a score of one). Perceptions of
flock infection that indicated a locus of control outside
of the respondent such as the particular belief that flock
infection depends on God’s will were also given a score
of one. The acceptability of particular strategies was also
scored i.e. those villages where the collective norm noted
any of the following activities was acceptable were given
a score of one: scavenging of poultry in the village,
throwing dead birds on the street, consuming sick birds
and not reporting an outbreak or not burying dead birds.
Finally, all households receiving a three or four as a
Food Insecurity Score were deemed more vulnerable to
the effects of A(H5N1) and therefore given a score of
one.
Justification for the weighting of the index is as fol-
lows. Each of the factors in the attitudinal loci i.e. low
human risk, low sense of control and community norm
were each given a score of one. Core factors as part of
the behaviour loci were also given a score of one i.e. lack
of precautionary measures and poultry sales. Finally,
factors in the ‘predisposing’ loci i.e. previous exposure to
A(H5N1) and food insecurity were also given a score of
one in the following equation:
CRI ¼ Perception Loci 3ð Þ þ Behaviour Loci 2ð Þ
þ Predisposing Loci 2ð Þ
As described above, given that perceptions regarding
animal disease drive behaviour this locus contained the
largest number of factors and therefore a priori import-
ance to the index. Consequently, the lack of precaution-
ary or preventive behaviours toward the disease in
addition to poultry sales were accorded a top score of
two. The final portion of the index contained critical
physical predisposing factors such as exposure to a prior
outbreak and household-level food insecurity. By creat-
ing a linked scoring system, the CRI can be easily
adapted to other geographies/nations.
Statistical analysis
Continuous variables were compared using
Independent-samples T-Test or One-way ANOVA. Cat-
egorical variables were analysed using Chi-square tests
and Fisher’s exact tests. For all analyses, significance
levels were two-tailed, and a P value of 0.05 was consid-
ered significant. All analyses were performed using SPSS
Version 22.0 (IBM Corp, USA).
Table 2 Composite risk index components
CRI loci Factors Score
Perception loci Low human risk 1
Perception loci Low sense of control 1
Perception loci Community norm 1
Behaviour loci Lack of precautionary action 1
Behaviour loci Poultry sales 1
Predisposing loci Previous exposure flock 1
Predisposing loci Food insecure 1
Total 7
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Results
Eighty-one respondents (61.3%) reported having expe-
rienced one or more A(H5N1) outbreaks. Over one-
third of the very poor households (35.7%) experienced
multiple A(H5N1) outbreaks. An One-way ANOVA
test indicated that the very poor experienced a higher
number of self-reported outbreaks on average during
the study period (m = 1.24, ±1.14) compared to the
poor (m = 0.91, ±1.05) and medium (m = 1.02, ±1.19)
households, however this difference was not signifi-
cant, p = 0.395. Across the subsets, the difference in
the number of self-reported outbreaks was more strik-
ing, see Table 3.
Households in Subsets one, three and five had experi-
enced approximately two times more A(H5N1) out-
breaks in their flock compared to their better-off
counterparts (subsets two, four and six) in the same
wealth group. Although an One-way ANOVA test indi-
cated that these differences were not statistically signifi-
cant, p = 0.155, the findings do show a trend of higher
vulnerability to A(H5N1) flock infection among
widowed or divorced women with little or no education
or agricultural land.
The results from the CRI scores across governorates
and study villages are detailed in Additional file 3.
The most southern located governorate of Souhag had
the highest CRI score (4.12). Food insecurity is particu-
larly prevalent among households in this governorate,
contributing in part to the high CRI score. Overall, nine
villages had CRI scores of 4.0 or greater indicating their
risk to A(H5N1) infection.
Across the study set five villages had an awareness
raising campaign. An Independent samples T-test was
run to determine if the average CRI score of respondents
was different between villages where awareness cam-
paigns had taken place and where no awareness cam-
paigns had taken place. Mean CRI score for villages
where awareness raising had taken place (3.75) and vil-
lages where no awareness raising had taken place (3.67)
was not statistically significant, p = 0.844. Having had an
awareness raising campaign was thus not associated with
significantly reduced risk of flock infection.
With regards to social norms, overall scores indicate
that slaughtering sick and dead birds and consuming
them is considered the least acceptable, followed by
throwing dead birds and slaughter remains on the street,
not reporting if birds are infected, having poultry scav-
enge freely in the street and lastly burying dead birds.
No differences were found with regards to community
norms in villages where awareness campaigns had taken
place vs. those where no awareness campaigns had taken
place. The most interesting results relate to high per-
centage of respondents who offered that such behaviours
around sick or dead birds were acceptable. For example,
over one-third of study participants ranked poultry scav-
enging as acceptable while 20% noted that not reporting
an A(H5N1) outbreak was equally OK. Despite 75% of
the study group noting that burying dead birds was ‘ac-
ceptable’, the most common disposal method for dead
birds was throwing them in or near canals or on garbage
heaps.
Respondents in three of the CRI high score villages
(Nagu Aba Awad, Nazlat Fareg Mahmoud and El
Robeiat) had been exposed to an awareness campaign.
Interestingly, Nazlat Fareg Mahmoud had collectively
among the highest score for lack of preventive actions
and also scored highest on low sense of control i.e. the
majority of respondents expressed flock infection was
beyond their control. Thereby, the composite index can
reveal particular areas for improvement in subsequent
awareness campaigns.
The CRI scores for the wealth groups are presented in
Fig. 1.
As Fig. 1 illustrates, medium wealth level households
had the lowest CRI score (2.55). Interestingly, the poor
as opposed to the very poor had the highest CRI score,
3.31 and 3.00 respectively. This high score can mainly be
attributed to the high score (3.64) of the uneducated
widowed or divorced subset within this wealth group.
The CRI scores for the subsets are presented in Fig. 2.
Subset three and five scored persistently higher com-
pared to their better-endowed counterparts within the
same wealth group (i.e. subset four and six). The differ-
ence between subsets three and four was striking. Subset
Table 3 Self-reported A(H5N1) outbreaks in household flocks by subsets
Subset No outbreaks (%) One outbreak (%) Two or more outbreaks (%) Number of self-reported A(H5N1)
outbreaks (average)
1 15.4 38.5 46.2 1.6
2 50.0 30.0 20.0 0.8
3 35.7 35.7 28.6 1.1
4 58.7 33.3 8.3 0.5
5 45.0 20.0 35.0 1.2
6 37.5 62.5 0.0 0.6
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three had the highest component score for selling of
poultry and lack of precautionary behaviours.
A Q-square test indicated that higher education levels
(i.e. secondary and higher) in particular were found to
be associated with a range of effective biosecurity mea-
sures, see Table 4.
Lack of education was particularly associated with lack
of precautionary actions, p = 0.009 (Phi = 0.236, p = 0.009).
Subset six had the lowest CRI score, thus indicating lower
risk of A(H5N1) infection compared to the other groups.
This can be attributed to relatively low scores on each of
the individual components but in particular food insecurity
and risk perceptions (Fig. 2). None of the respondents were
food insecure (score 0.0) and as the analysis pointed out,
food security is particularly associated with wealth and
higher education levels. Only a minority expressed that
A(H5N1) infection of their flock was outside of their con-
trol (0.30) and few believed the likelihood of human infec-
tion to be low (0.30).
Overall the very poor and poor as well as subsets
where women were widowed or divorced with low
education levels were likely more vulnerable to food in-
security and A(H5N1) outbreaks in their flocks. These
groups tended not to take effective precautionary actions
Fig. 1 CRI scores among wealth groups
Fig. 2 CRI scores among subsets
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and also had a tendency to express fatalistic beliefs. For
example the belief that human infection depends on
God’s will is significantly associated with the poor and
very poor wealth level, p = 0.039 (Cramer’s V = 0.245, p
= 0.039). The belief that A(H5N1) virus could be trans-
ported through air for large distances, i.e. from one gov-
ernorate to the other, and therefore nothing could be
done about it was significantly associated with very poor
households, p = 0.004 (Phi = 0.274, p = 0.004).
Discussion
Controlling A(H5N1) in Egypt is an urgent priority of
the Government. However, the results of the study illus-
trate that ultimately stamping out the disease may rely
on more targeted interventions and approaches that ac-
count for a range of abiotic drivers of disease from
socio-economic status to perceptions and beliefs regard-
ing causality and sense of control over the disease itself.
This is in line with Paul et al. [20] who concluded that a
multidisciplinary approach is needed to study common
practices and underlying believes and rationales to be
able to develop policies that take more account of the
realities on the ground. The implementation of effective
biosecurity measures within resource poor contexts de-
pends upon careful consideration of the interests of
poultry farmers [5, 17, 19, 21, 45].
Application of the Composite Risk Index points to
communities where vulnerability to A(H5N1) infection
is likely to be high. Vulnerability to A(H5N1) infection
at the community level is multifaceted and complex and
as the study illustrated, based on a variety of factors.
Tools which enhance targeting and identifying areas
where values, norms and attitudes may inhibit control
efforts at the outset are likely to improve disease out-
comes at the community level.
Many authors have commented on the fact that, al-
though national A(H5N1) awareness raising efforts
may have been successful in increasing awareness and
knowledge of A(H5N1), the gap between knowing
what to do and applying this knowledge remains large
[20, 47]. Equally this study showed that prior aware-
ness raising campaigns had not resulted in a signifi-
cant increase in effective precautionary behaviours.
This is likely explained by a discrepancy in focus and
priorities between government officials and poultry
producers. This study pointed to the fact that con-
cerns of respondents related more to loss of food se-
curity and income as a result of A(H5N1) outbreaks
and associated control measures and less to human
infection, while the latter had been the main concern
of the Egyptian government. Such discrepancies with
regard to priorities of national governments and back-
yard poultry producers have also been described by
Velasco et al. [18] and Paul et al. [20], and have been
commented on as a serious barrier for effective
A(H5N1) prevention and control.
In Laos, training on A(H5N1) prevention is usually
given to men in urban locations while the target group
is mainly female, live in remote areas and are often of
ethnic minority who do not speak Lao [18]. Moreover
such training commonly focuses on technical aspects
while lacking consideration of underlying beliefs and ra-
tionales that influence risk perception and protective be-
haviours or lack thereof.
Therefore, future awareness raising efforts need to ac-
count for these concerns with special attention to the
poor and widowed/divorced subsets of household
poultry keepers who proved to be particularly vulnerable
to A(H5N1) outbreaks. Velasco et al. [18] also described
how the poor and women in particular face difficulties
in accessing information and how lack of education in-
creased their risk of infection.
Widowhood was unanimously regarded as an indicator
of poverty among the study participants. While women
living in households with access to land and with higher
education levels were recognized as part of the ‘better-
off ’ at the community level. Therefore uneducated,
widowed women had a very different experience than
married educated women. To accommodate these differ-
ences, a range of subsets were created that combined a
range of recognized demographic, social and wellbeing
indicators related to poverty and these were used along
with the broader wealth groups to look at how these ele-
ments may inform risk behaviour and perceptions, liveli-
hood activities and food security. The subset approach
described in this article enabled a more intricate under-
standing of how marriage/widowhood, education levels
and access to resources influenced a wide range of issues
such as vulnerability to A(H5N1), risk perceptions and
preventive behaviours.
Table 4 Associations between higher education and effective preventive biosecurity measures
Biosecurity measures P value Strength of association
(Phi or Cramer’s V)
Hand washing after handling poultry 0.027 0.200
Changing shoes and clothes before attending to poultry 0.021 0.208
Vaccinating poultry 0.000 0.390
Keeping wild birds away from flock 0.004 0.256
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We found that education was related to the applica-
tion of effective biosecurity measures. Similarly several
authors have described how education had a positive ef-
fect on avian influenza related knowledge as well as pre-
ventive measures in Thailand [18, 20], Taiwan [48],
Vietnam [49], Nigeria [50] and China [51]. Among the
study set poverty was linked to lack of education and a
lack of effective precautionary behaviours, thus making
the poor and their poultry even more vulnerable to
A(H5N1) infection.
Among the cockfighting community in Thailand
“strategies to avoid HPAI surveillance and control mea-
sures were actually collectively organized, [and] relied on
strong social bonds.” ([20]: page 113). In our study we
found that even if individuals perceive certain behav-
iours such as wearing protective clothes or burying dead
birds as reducing the risk of infection, group norm
(through mockery among others) may impede individual
beneficiary precautionary action. Such cultural related
group norms can thus prevent implementation due to
feelings of shame and embarrassment even among those
that do understand and regard the practice as beneficial.
This is particularly important in settings where social
standing and acceptance are highly valued and
important.
Conclusions
The CRI points to high-risk communities but also helps
in identifying key areas within the community that need
strengthening. These could relate to community norms
impeding implementation of biosecurity measures or
prevalence of outbreaks.
The CRI has been developed keeping in mind that its
application in the field should be practical and simple.
Thereby keeping time and data requirements to a mini-
mum while still being comprehensive enough to account
for relevant social, economic, epidemiological and psy-
chological factors both at the individual and community
level contributing to vulnerability to A(H5N1) infection
in both poultry and humans.
However, overall the tool was created with the budget-
ary and time constraints of field staff on the ground by
focusing on seven indicators for which a short question-
naire addressed at the household level will suffice. In
Egypt, some of the data requirements for the CRI might
be readily available within the Central Agency for Public
Mobilization and statistics (CAPMAS) or the village in-
formation units. In some instances, reliable information
on A(H5N1) outbreaks at the community level might be
available and this information could replace the house-
hold level data on self-reported A(H5N1) outbreaks,
thereby reducing data requirements.
The core themes of risk perception, epidemiology and
food security are relevant for a wide variety of other
infectious diseases and the indicators used within these
core themes can be easily adapted to suit local circum-
stances across a range of geographies.
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